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Damiano: Prosecutorial Misconduct

NOTE
TAKING A CLOSER LOOK AT
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT:
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S
MATERIALITY ANALYSIS IN
HAYES V. BROWN AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS
Nowhere in the Constitution or in the Declaration of Independence, nor for that matter in the Federalist or in any
other writing of the Founding Fathers, can one find a single
utterance that could justify the decision by any oathbeholden servant of the law to look the other way when confronted by the real possibility of being complicit in the
wrongful use of false evidence to secure a conviction in
court. 1

INTRODUCTION

Over the last two decades, an alarming number of wrongful convictions have been overturned, primarily as a result of
successful exonerations by the Innocence Project. 2 In a survey
1 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 988 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting N. Marianna Is·
lands v. Bowie, 236 F. 3d 1083, 1096 (9th Cir. 2001».
2 See The Innocence Project, http://innocenceproject.org (last visited Aug. 10,
2006). The Innocence Project was founded by Barry Scheck and Peter Neufeld at the
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of the causes of wrongful convictions, prosecutorial misconduct
was listed as a cause in nearly half of the cases. 3 In twenty-five
percent of those cases, the type of misconduct was the knowing
use of false testimony.4 Perjured testimony in general, particularly by cooperating witnesses, has been another major cause of
these terrible injustices. 5
The prosecutor's actions in Hayes v. Brown 6 illustrate how
this type of prosecutorial misconduct can lead to wrongful convictions. By presenting false evidence and misleading the
judge, jury, and opposing counsel, the prosecution enhanced
the credibility of its key witness. 7 By providing inducements to
this accomplice witness, the prosecutor gave him a significant
incentive to lie-an incentive about which the jury was not
fully informed. 8 Blufford Hayes was convicted and sentenced
to death as a result. 9 Although this case may not be one of factual innocence, Hayes illustrates how a prosecutor's unethical
conduct resulted in a tainted and unjust trial.
This note argues that the Ninth Circuit's meaningful factual analysis in applying the materiality standard led to its reversal of Mr. Hayes's conviction. The Court's willingness to
look beyond the Government's assertions and to take into account every way in which the prosecutor's duplicitous conduct
might have affected the jury's verdict allowed it to reach a different decision than prior reviewing courts. Moreover, the
Court did so while adhering to established Supreme Court
precedent and remaining within the confines of modern federal
habeas review.1° The Ninth Circuit's analysis under this standard can help prevent wrongful convictions by deterring proseBenjamin N. Cardozo School of Law in 1992. It has since expanded into the national
Innocence Network and has exonerated over 160 people.
3 See The Innocence Project, http://innocenceproject.org/causes/ (last visited
Aug. 10, 2006) (finding thirty-three of the seventy-four DNA exonerations surveyed
were caused by prosecutorial misconduct).
4 See id.
5 See id (finding fourteen of the seventy-four DNA exonerations were caused by
the perjury of accomplices and snitches); see also Steven Clark, Procedural Reforms in
Capital Cases Applied to Perjury, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 453, 453 (2001) (finding the
most common cause of capital wrongful convictions in Illinois is perjury) .
. 6 See generally Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972.
7Id. at 985-86.
S See id. at 979.
9Id. at 977.
10 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959); Giglio v. United States, 405
U.S. 150, 154 (1972); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,412 (2000).
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cutorial misconduct and encouraging prosecutors to take care
in using the bargained-for testimony of accomplice witnesses.
Further, the Court's holding can lead to reversals of wrongful
convictions by instructing other courts to engage in meaningful
reviews of such claims.
Part I of this note provides the background on the evolution of the materiality standard and its application in modern
federal habeas review.l 1 Part II fully describes the facts, procedural history, and holdings in the Hayes case.l 2 Part III analyzes how the Ninth Circuit reached its conclusion to reverse
Mr. Hayes's conviction through its application of the materiality standard.l 3 Further, this Part outlines how this depth of
analysis can help reverse and prevent wrongful convictions
caused by prosecutorial misconduct and false testimony.l4 Part
IV concludes that to preserve the integrity of the criminal justice system, state misconduct must not go unchecked, as it has
been shown to lead to the convictions of innocent persons. 15
1.

BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court has long disapproved of prosecutors
employing deceptive means to obtain convictions.l 6 By 1935,
the Court had recognized that a State's use of false evidence offended the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.l 7 Subsequently, the Court established that a
prosecutor's failure to correct false testimony was unconstitutional.1 8 The landmark cases of Napue v. Illinois and Brady v.
Maryland held that reversal was required for non-disclosure of
evidence or for the use of false testimony only if it affected the
outcome of the trial. 19 This principle would become known as
the "materiality" standard, a second inquiry after establishing
a violation of a defendant's due process rights.20 Other SuSee infra notes 16-70 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 71-149 and accompanying text_
13 See infra notes 150-185 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 186-206 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 207-209 and accompanying text.
16 See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1935).
17 See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
18 See Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31 (1957).
19 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963).
20 See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); United States v.
11

12
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preme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions provide guidance on
what factors determine whether false evidence is "material"
and what circumstances warrant reversal.2 1
A.

EARLY SUPREME COURT CASES ADDRESSING
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND THE USE OF FALSE
EVIDENCE

The Supreme Court first granted relief for the use of false
testimony by a prosecutor in Mooney v. Holohan. 22 There, the
defendant alleged that the prosecution had used false testimony to obtain his conviction and death sentence. 23 Further,
he contended that the prosecutor withheld evidence that would
have exposed the perjury.24 In rejecting the Government's narrow view of due process requirements, the Court held the
State's knowing use of false testimony was "inconsistent with
the rudimentary demands of justice," and hence, unconstitutiona1. 25
Seven years later, in Pyle v. Kansas, the Court held that
suppression of evidence favorable to the accused was sufficient
to create constitutional error. 26 There, a prosecutor coerced a
witness to testify falsely.27 After being convicted, the defendant obtained written statements from both the witness and
the prosecutor admitting to the perjury and stating that the
trial had been unfair. 28 The Court reversed, holding that these
allegations indicated that defendant's constitutional rights had
been violated. 29
Further, in Alcorta v. Texas, the Supreme Court announced that prosecutors have an independent duty to correct
information they know to be false. 3D There, the defendant had
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2005).
21 See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154; Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103; United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 684 (1985).
22 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 115 (1935).
23Id. at 110.
24Id.
25Id. at 112.
26

Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215-16 (1942).

27Id. at 214.
28Id. at 215.
29Id. at 216.
30 Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 32 (1957). See also Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S.
264, 269 (1959) (recognizing rule); Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2005)
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argued he killed his wife in the heat of passion when he saw
her kissing another man. 31 Prior to calling the man the prosecutor instructed him not to testify that he had had intercourse
with defendant's wife unless he was asked explicitly.32 The
witness then testified that he had not had relations with defendant's wife. 33 The Court found that the prosecutor's failure
to correct the false testimony violated due process. 34 In reversing the defendant's conviction and death sentence, the Court
reasoned that had the jury heard about the affair, it might
have accepted defendant's heat of passion defense. 35 Therefore,
although the Court had yet to coin the term "materiality," it
had begun to consider the impact of the constitutional violation
on the outcome of the defendant's trial in reaching its decision.

B.

THE MODERN CASES GOVERNING REVERSAL FOR
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND THE EMERGENCE OF
THE MATERIALITY STANDARD: NAPUE AND BRADY

In the seminal case regarding a prosecutor's use of false
testimony, Napue v. Illinois, the Court announced the circumstances and standards that warranted reversa1. 36 Napue involved false testimony that went to the credibility of a key
prosecution witness. 37 The witness testified that he had not received a sentence reduction for his testimony and the prosecutor failed to correct his statement. 3S In reversing, the Court
reasoned that credibility evidence pertaining to a key witness
was sufficient to warrant reversal under those circumstances. 39
In addition, it held that although the jury had heard other evidence about the witness' credibility, the outcome still might
have been different had the jury known about the sentence reduction. 40 This case established the test for materiality that
the Ninth Circuit applied in Hayes: a new trial is required "if
(same).

Alcorta, 355 U.S. at 28-29.
[d. at 31.
33 [d. at 29.
34 [d.
35 [d. at 32.
36 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 264 (1959).
37 [d. at 267.
38 [d.
39 [d. at 269.
40 [d. at 270.
31

32
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the false testimony could ... in any reasonable likelihood have
affected the judgment of the jury."41 Moreover, the Napue
Court identified three important factors in applying this standard: (1) the nature of the false evidence, (2) the importance of
the witness to the prosecution's case, and (3) whether the evidence was cumulative. 42
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court recognized another form of prosecutorial misconduct as unconstitutional: the
failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defense. 43 The
Court held that reversal for nondisclosure of evidence was
warranted regardless of whether the prosecutor had intentionally withheld the evidence. 44 However, the Court also held that
defendant's due process rights are violated only "where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment."45 Subsequent cases would clarify that what constituted "material" evidence depended on whether or not the prosecutor's misconduct
was intentiona1. 46
C.

POST NAPUEI BRADY APPLICATION OF THE MATERIALITY
STANDARD UNDER MODERN FEDERAL HABEAS REVIEW

1.

Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit Cases

Recent cases have interpreted the materiality standards
set forth in Napue and Brady. For instance, Giglio v. United
States reaffirmed Napue, holding that the use of false testimony relating to credibility was sufficient to warrant a reversal.47 There, defendant alleged both the prosecution's nondisclosure of immunity given to a key witness and the use of false
testimony.48 The Court emphasized that materiality often
turned on the importance of the witness' credibility to which
the suppressed evidence relates: "[w]hen the 'reliability of a
41Id. at 271·72; Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 989 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tallman, J.,
dissenting).
42 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 2~9.70 (1959).
43 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (citing Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S.
213, 213 (1942».
44 Id.
45Id.
46 See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 103·04 (1976).
47 Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154.
48Id. at 150-51.
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given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,'
nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this
general rule [of materiality]."49 The Court further noted in
United States v. Bagley that it has consistently refused to distinguish between exculpatory and impeachment evidence in determining materiality.50
In United States v. Agurs, the Supreme Court held that different standards of materiality applied depending on whether
or not the prosecutor knowingly used the false evidence. 51 It
reasoned that Napue's "any reasonable likelihood" standard is
a lower standard of materiality that should apply only when a
state knowingly presents false evidence to the jury.52 The
Agurs Court explained that this standard was appropriate in
such cases "not just because they involve prosecutorial misconduct, but more importantly because they involve a corruption of
the truth-seeking process."53 Therefore, courts are more likely
to find a violation material when false evidence is used intentionally rather than inadvertently. 54 Finally, the Agurs Court
also implied that this standard was implicated when a prosecutor knew or should have known that the testimony was false. 55
However, the circuits are split on this proposition. 56
Among the cases in which the Ninth Circuit has applied
Napue's standard,57 Benn v. Lambert discussed the issue of
cumulative impeachment in determining materiality. 58 There,
the Court found Brady error for the prosecutor's knowing failure to disclose damaging evidence relating to the credibility of

49Id. at 154 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959».

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675·76 (1985) (citing Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972».
51 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
52 Id. at 103.
53Id. at 104.
50

54Id.
55Id. at 103.
56 See Aron E. Goldschneider, Edict v. Dicta: Rolling Back Rights in the Second
Circuit under the Clearly Established Clause of the AEDPA Amended Habeas Statute,
26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 49 (2005) [hereinafter Goldschneider] (finding that the First,
Second, Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have recognized the "should have
known" standard, while the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh Circuits require actual
knowledge).
57 See, e.g., Belmontes v. Woodford, 350 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 125 S.
Ct. 1697 (2005); N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 236 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2001).
58 Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1054·1059 (9th Cir. 2002).
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a key prosecution witness. 59 The Court rejected the argument
that the suppressed evidence was cumulative because the
prosecution had disclosed some impeachment evidence pertaining to the witness. 6o It reasoned that while some impeachment
evidence was disclosed, this did not render all undisclosed evidence cumulative. 61

2.

The Materiality Standard in Other Circuits

The application of the materiality standard varies among
the circuits. While some have applied the standard set forth in
Napue and Giglio in the broad manner advocated by the Ninth
Circuit in Hayes, other circuits have been more reluctant. For
example, the Second Circuit has been less receptive to habeas
claims under Napue. In a case dealing with whether shooting
murders were intentional or accidental, the prosecutor's knowing use of an "expert" whose qualifications and diagnosis of the
defendant were completely fictitious was found immateria1. 62
Because the diagnosis pertained to the probability that the defendant had shot the victims intentionally, there was arguably
some likelihood that the decision would have affected the jury's
verdict. 63
In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the denial of a petition for habeas corpus based on a prosecutor's failure to correct false testimony regarding a witness's
immunity.64 However, although the case is similar to Hayes in
that the false testimony pertained to impeachment of an accomplice witness, the Court's decision is more straightforward
due to the clear falsity of the testimony and the lower court's
application of the wrong standard. 65 Nevertheless, the Court's
reversal of a capital conviction based on the false accomplice
testimony pertaining to credibility was in the spirit of the
Hayes decision.

59Id. at 1054.
60 Id. at 1054·55.
6! Id.
62 Drake v. Portuondo, 321 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 2003).
63 See Goldschneider, supra note 56, at 55·56 (arguing that the court's interpre·
tation of review under the AEDPA led to a finding that the violation was immaterial
even though reversal was warranted).
64 Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457, 1458 (11th Cir. 1986).
65Id. at 1464.
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Although these cases had different outcomes, both illustrate the narrower view of the materiality standard taken in
other circuits. If the courts had applied the reasoning from
Hayes, both would have resulted in clear reversals.

3.

Modern Habeas Corpus Review Under theAEDPA

No discussion of the application of a Supreme Court standard on federal habeas review can be complete without noting
the significant impact of the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA").66 Under subsection 2254(d)(1)
of the AEDPA, federal courts may only reverse a conviction if
the state appellate court's decision is "contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law."67 The Supreme Court later held that the "clearly established" language referred only to "holdings, as opposed to the
dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the
relevant state-court decision."68 The AEDPA has limited the
ability of federal courts to review independently habeas claims,
and has been criticized for doing so at the same time that
wrongful convictions continued to be discovered. 69 With the
chilling effect of the AEDPA as a backdrop, the Ninth Circuit's
analysis in Hayes becomes even more significant.
The Ninth Circuit followed the standard and reasoning set
forth in the Supreme Court cases in reaching its decision in
Hayes as permitted under the AEDPA.70 Nevertheless, the
Hayes Court reached a different result than prior reviewing
courts. The consistently strong disapproval of state misconduct
in earlier cases indicates that the Hayes Court's conclusion was
appropriate.

II. THE HAYES V. BROWN DECISION
In Hayes, the Ninth Circuit revisited the materiality stan66 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub L. No. 104·132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
67 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d) (West 2006).
68 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000).
69 See Goldschneider, supra note 56, at 8; see also Alan K. Chen, Shadow Law:
Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 535, 539 (1999) (arguing that AEDPA's highly deferential standard has
"handcuffed" habeas review in federal courts).
70 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 987-88 (9th Cir. 2005).
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dard in analyzing the state's use of false evidence. Its careful
scrutiny of the facts, coupled with its thorough consideration of
the materiality of the false testimony, led to the reversal of Mr.
Hayes's conviction.
A.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Vinod "Pete" Patel was murdered at a motel in Stockton,
California on New Year's Day in 1980.71 Mr. Patel was the motel's manager, and Blufford Hayes was staying in a room with
his sister.72 Mr. Hayes's sister later testified that at the time,
the sink in her room had been leaking and that she had asked
Mr. Patel to fix it. 73 When she returned from work that day,
she found Mr. Patel's body in her room.74 Mr. Patel had died as
a result of multiple stab wounds. 75

1.

The Events of January 1, 1980 According to Blufford Hayes

Mr. Hayes testified that he went to the motel office to complain to Mr. Patel about the leaky sink, returned to his room
and went to sleep. 76 He testified that he awoke to someone
slapping him and realized it was Mr. Patel. 77 Allegedly, Mr.
Patel had a knife and during the struggle, Mr. Hayes stabbed
him in the arm and chest. 78 Mr. Hayes then bound Mr. Patel's
hands and feet with wire hangers, supposedly to put an end to
the fight. 79
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hayes went to the motel room of
Andrew James, a longtime acquaintance. 8o Mr. James shared
the room with his girlfriend, Michelle Gebert. 81 Mr. Hayes
stated that he needed a ride because he had "downed" someone. 82 Mr. James said he did not believe it and would go see for
Id. at 974.
Id.
73 Id. at 975.
74 Id. at 976.
75 Id.
76 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2005).
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 975 (9th Cir. 2005).
71

72
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himself. S3 However, when Mr. Hayes looked out, Mr. James
had not gone to the room, but instead was in the motel office. s4
Mr. Hayes went to the office and found Mr. James taking boxes
of cigarettes out of the office. s5 They loaded them into Mr.
James's car and left.s6

2.

The Events of January 1, 1980 According to Andrew James

Mr. James's testimony differed from that of Mr. Hayes. He
testified that he left his room with Mr. Hayes. s7 When he arrived at his car, there were already two boxes of cigarettes inside. ss Mr. James testified that it was not until they were in
the car that Mr. Hayes told him that he had "offed" Mr. Pate1. 89
Mr. Hayes stated that Mr. Patel had swung at him and that
Mr. Hayes had "[done] the do with him."90 Mter he returned to
the motel, Mr. James discussed what to do with Ms. Gebert. 91
He testified that he had been afraid to go to the police because
he "had cases at the time," but Ms. Gebert eventually called the
police. 92
Mr. Hayes was arrested and tried before a jury in San Joaquin County.93 By this time, Mr. James had moved to Florida. 94 The prosecution flew him back to California to testify,
promising that he would be permitted to return afterward. 95 At
the time of his testimony, Mr. James had four felony charges
pending in California: three counts of felony theft with a prior
conviction and a charge of being under the influence of heroin. 96 He also had a history of convictions for theft crimes. 97
Prior to trial, prosecutor Terrence Van Oss and Mr.
83Id.
84Id.
85Id.
86Id. at 975-76.
87Id. at 976.
88

Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2005).

89Id.
90Id.
91Id.
92Id.
93Id.
94

Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2005).

95Id. at 976-77.
96Id. at 977.
97Id.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 1 [2006], Art. 8

202

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

James's attorney agreed to give Mr. James transactional immunity for the murder and to dismiss his other pending felonies. 98 However, Mr. Van ass insisted that Mr. James not be
informed about the dismissal of the charges so that he could
testify that they were still pending. 99 Several notes in Mr.
James's attorney's file established that such a deal was in
place, that Mr. James need not attend arraignments on the
charges, and that the charges were to be dismissed at the conclusion of Mr. Hayes's trial.100 In addition, the notes revealed
Mr. Van ass's desire to keep the deal secret.l° 1
After he secured the deal, Mr. Van ass misled both the
judge and Mr. Hayes's counsel in pretrial hearings by denying
any such negotiations had occurred.l°2 At trial, Mr. Van ass
deliberately elicited false testimony from Mr. James that he
had received no such deal. 103 Defense counsel impeached Mr.
James with his prior convictions, drug use, and transactional
immunity.l°4 In closing arguments, the prosecution emphasized Mr. James's credibility.l°5
A jury convicted Mr. Hayes of first-degree murder, burglary, and robbery.lo6 In addition, the jury found two special
circumstances, burglary-murder and robbery-murder, to be
true. 107 The Court followed the jury's recommendation and
sentenced Mr. Hayes to death.l°8 On appeal, the California
Supreme Court reversed the robbery conviction and the robbery-murder special circumstance.l°9 However, it affirmed Mr.
Hayes's other convictions and the death sentence.l 10
In 1995, Mr. Hayes filed his first amended petition for a
writ of habeas corpus in federal court.lll The court held evidentiary hearings both on penalty phase issues and on an inef98
99

100

Id.
Id.
Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 979 (9th Cir. 2005).

Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
101

at 979·980.
at 980.
at 987.
at 980.
106 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 2005).

Id.
Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
107

108
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fective assistance of counsel claim. ll2 Both parties moved for
summary judgment and the magistrate judge recommended
granting the State's motion.1 13 A district court judge reviewed
and denied Mr. Hayes's petition.l 14 Mter a divided panel affirmed the judgment, the Ninth Circuit voted to rehear the decision en banc. ll5
B.

EN BANC NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION

Judge Thomas, writing for the majority, began by emphasizing the Court's disapproval of prosecutorial misconduct. ll6
He then closely reexamined the facts of the case and conducted
a thorough analysis of the materiality standard.l 17 Judge
Tallman, who wrote a partial dissent joined by three other
judges, agreed that Mr. Van Oss's conduct had violated Mr.
Hayes's constitutional rights.1 18 However, Tallman refused to
accept that the false testimony in this case affected the jury's
verdict, thus finding it immateriaJ.119

1.

The Majority

The Hayes majority first rejected the Government's contention that there was no violation of due process because Mr.
James did not commit perjury.120 The Court held that Napue
error occurred whenever false evidence was knowingly used,
regardless of whether the witness committed perjury, noting,
"[t]his saves [the witness] from perjury, but it does not make
his testimony truthful."121 In addition, the Court reasoned that
the affirmative duty set forth in Alcorta and Pyle required
prosecutors to correct testimony known to be false. 122 Therefore, the State's misconduct had resulted in a violation of Mr.
Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 977 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 974.
117 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 987·89 (9th Cir. 2005).
118 Id. at 989 (Tallman, J., concurring).
119 Id. at 989 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 980·81 (majority opinion).
121 Id. at 981 (quoting Willhoite v. Vasquez, 921 F.2d 247, 251 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Trott, J. concurring».
122 Id, at 981.
112
113
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Hayes's due process rights under both standards.
The majority also considered the standard of review that
should apply in the case.l 23 It noted that even when courts find
constitutional error, there is no per se rule of reversaP24 The
Court applied the rule from Napue that if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false evidence affected the jury's verdict, then the conviction cannot stand.l 25 It reasoned that the
Brecht harmless error analysis that generally applied to habeas
review was unnecessary because a finding of materiality was
necessarily also a finding that the error was not harmless.l 26
Applying the materiality standard, the Court reached the
crucial factual conclusion that Mr. James had some knowledge
that "something was afoot" regarding the "secret" deal. 127 This
finding was in direct opposition to the Government's factual assertions.l 28 The majority reasoned that Mr. James would not
have risked returning to California without the deal, as he had
been hesitant to go to the police in the first place because of his
outstanding charges. 129
The Court proceeded to consider the likelihood that Mr.
James's false testimony affected the jury's verdict. 130 First, Mr.
James's testimony was important to the prosecution's case because nearly all of the other evidence linking Mr. Hayes to Mr.
Patel's murder was circumstantiaP31 Additionally, Mr. James
provided the only evidence that supported the prosecution's
burglary-murder theory of the case, which was necessary for
the special circumstances to be found true, and for the death
sentence to be imposed.1 32 Finally, Mr. James alone testified
that Mr. Hayes had actually confessed to killing Mr. PateP33
Hence, Mr. James was a key prosecution witness and, accordingly, his credibility was a crucial factor for the jury to con-

123

Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 984 (9th Cir. 2005).

124Id.
125Id.
126Id. at 984·85.
127Id. at 987.
128Id. at 980.
129

Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 987 (9th Cir. 2005).

130Id. at 985-86.
131Id.
132Id. at 986.
133Id. at 985.
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sider. 134
Another significant factor in the Court's decision was its
finding that the false evidence was non-cumulative. It reasoned that the impeachment evidence regarding Mr. James
that the jury did hear was not as important as what they did
not hear.135 Since both Mr. Hayes and Mr. James were drug
users with criminal histories, these facts would not have been
important to the jury's determination of whom to believe.l 36
Further, the Court reasoned that the transactional immunity
Mr. James received was also insubstantial because Mr. James
probably would not have faced charges arising from this case
anyway.137 Consequently, the Court reasoned that Mr. James's
false testimony regarding the "secret" deal was noncumulative. 138
In addition, the majority noted that the constitutional violation under the prosecutor's duty to correct false evidence was
also material.1 39 It reasoned that had Mr. Van Oss corrected
Mr. James's false testimony, he would have been forced to reveal the details of the "secret" deal, which would likely have
caused the jury to lose all confidence in the reliability of the
prosecution.l 40 Accordingly, the Court found the prosecutor's
failure to perform his duty material.
Finally, the Court noted that this case was not an anomaly: numerous cases involving the knowing use of false evidence had recently come before the Court.141 In denouncing
such conduct, Judge Thomas opined, "[w]hen even a single conviction is obtained through perjurious or deceptive means, the
entire foundation of our system of justice is weakened."142

2.

The Dissent

Judge Tallman, writing for the four dissenters, concurred
that the use of false evidence violated Mr. Hayes's due process
134Id, at 987.
135 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 987 (9th Cir. 2005).
136Id.
137Id.
138Id.
139Id. at 988.
140 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 988 (9th Cir. 2005).
141Id.
142Id.
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rights, yet he strongly criticized the majority's holding on the
issue of materiality, arguing that the majority had misapplied
the standard.l 43 However, the dissent's disagreement with the
majority actually resulted primarily from its acceptance of the
Government's contention that Mr. James had no knowledge of
the deal, stating that, "[t]o label the testimony of James 'false'
is a misnomer on these facts."144 In accepting this version of
the facts, the dissent reasoned that Mr. James had no further
incentive to testify, that his credibility remained unchanged,
and that his testimony regarding the deal was thus immaterial.1 45
The dissent further argued that the evidence of the "secret"
deal was cumulative because Mr. James's credibility was sufficiently tested by other evidence.l 46 It noted that the jury heard
of Mr. James's transactional immunity and other favors from
the State, including money and airline tickets. 147 The dissent
contended that since these factors could have affected Mr.
James's credibility, the dismissal of the other felonies only
amounted to cumulative impeachment evidence and was immaterial.1 48 Therefore, based on its assumption that Mr. James
knew nothing about the "secret" deal when he testified and
that the deal would have amounted to cumulative impeachment, the dissent found the majority's conclusions on the materiality issue improper. 149
III. THE COURT'S MATERIALITY ANALYSIS IN HAYES AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS FOR WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

The Ninth Circuit reached its conclusion in Hayes by carefully reexamining the facts in deciding whether the false testimony pertaining to Mr. James's credibility was reasonably
likely to have affected the jury's verdict.1 50 By engaging in this
meaningful review of Mr. Hayes's case, the Court granted relief
while adhering to the materiality standard set forth in Napue
143Id. at 989 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 990.
145Id. (Tallman, J., dissenting).
146

Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 990 (9th Cir. 2005) (Tallman, J., dissenting).

147Id.
148Id.
149Id. at 991 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
150Id. at 985·88.
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and its progeny.151 Accordingly, other courts should follow the
Hayes majority's materiality analysis to ensure the reversal of
wrongful convictions caused by prosecutorial misconduct.
A.

THE MAJORITY'S FINDING THAT MR. JAMES HAD SOME
KNOWLEDGE OF THE "SECRET" DEAL

The majority's determination that Mr. James must have
known that "something was afoot" regarding his pending felonies, and its finding that the "secret" deal was in all likelihood
not secret, were crucial to its holding on materiality.152 Despite
both the Government's and the dissent's insistence that Mr.
James was unaware of the deal, the majority reexamined the
facts and reached a different and more logical conclusion that
ultimately led to reversal.
1.

Mr. James's Return from California

In the intervening period between the murder of Pete Patel
and the prosecution of Mr. Hayes, Mr. James had moved from
California to Florida. 153 In spite of his pending felonies in California, Mr. James agreed to reenter the jurisdiction to testify in
Mr. Hayes's murder trial.1 54 Not only was it likely that Mr.
James relocated to Florida because he was a "wanted man" in
California, but it was highly improbable that he decided to return without any promise that he would not be arrested. Mr.
Van Oss's promise that Mr. James could return to Florida after
testifying would have indicated to Mr. James that he need not
worry about being prosecuted for his pending felonies. Further, Mr. James's testimony in the Hayes trial revealed his concerns about his pending charges. 155 He stated that when he
discussed what to do about the murder with Ms. Gebert, he expressed his fear of calling the police due to his pending felonies.1 56 Hence, Mr. James' testimony indicated that from the
outset he was concerned with being involved in the case due to
151 Id.; Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97,103-04 (1976); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959).
152 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 987 (9th Cir. 2005).
153Id. at 979.
154Id.
155Id. at 976.
156Id.
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his own problems with the law. The majority recognized that
the only logical explanation for Mr. James's cooperation was
his expectation that he would face neither immediate incarceration upon his return,157 nor years in prison after being convicted of the pending charges. 158 Thus, the Court concluded
that Mr. James had at least some knowledge of the deal.

2.

The Indicia of Special Treatment

The Court's reasoning that Mr. James could not have overlooked the special treatment he received as soon as he became
involved in the Hayes case was a logical conclusion drawn from
the facts. First, Mr. James was not arrested, incarcerated or
even arraigned on his pending felonies throughout his twentytwo-month-Iong involvement in the case,159 In addition, he did
not attend a single court appearance for those charges and suffered no repercussions as a result,160 Mr. James had been involved in the criminal justice system on numerous prior occasions and would have known that it was unusual not to be
required to appear at court proceedings. 161 Surely his attorney
provided him with an explanation of why he need not attend
any of these proceedings. Hence, the Court properly concluded
that either by his attorney's words or conduct, Mr. James had
knowledge of the deal.
The majority determined that Mr. James's knowledge that
he would not be prosecuted for his pending felonies was the
logical conclusion based on the facts of this case. Since the
knowledge that he would not face jail time was likely the decisive factor in Mr. James's decision to come to California and
testify against Mr. Hayes, it was a fact the jury should have

157 See First Amended Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Hayes v. Brown, 399
F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hayes Habeas], at 56; see also
Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2002). At the time, Mr. James was on probation. Therefore, by reentering California, he could have been incarcerated immediately for violating probation, and would have remained so pending the outcome of his
current felony charges.
158 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 987 (9th Cir. 2005).
159 See Hayes Habeas, supra note 157, at 58-60. Mr. James's arraignment was
continued on twelve separate occasions during proceedings against Mr. Hayes, from
February 1980 to December 1981. Neither Mr. James nor his attorney appeared at any
of these proceedings.
160 See id.
161 See Hayes, 399 F.3d at 977.
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heard in determining his credibility. The Court's close factual
analysis led it to reject unconvincing assertions that Mr. James
was kept in the dark. In this way, the majority was able to
avoid the troubling implications of the Government's materiality argument, which essentially asserted that precisely because
they had kept the truth from the Court and the witness, the
Government should be found not to have influenced the outcome.
B.

THE MATERIALITY OF THE FALSE TESTIMONY AND THE
PROSECUTOR'S F AlLURE TO CORRECT IT

The Ninth Circuit's close analysis of Mr. Van Oss's misconduct under the "any reasonable likelihood" standard set
forth in Napue and its progeny led to the Court's reversal when
previous reviewing courts had affirmed. Under the assumption
that Mr. James must have had some awareness of the "secret"
deal, the Court examined both the importance of his false testimony to the prosecution's theory of the case, and whether or
not impeaching Mr. James with this deal would have been cumulative. 162 Finally, the Court considered the likely outcome of
the case had the prosecutor performed his duty of correcting
the false testimony.163 By carefully considering whether these
factors would have affected the jury's verdict, the Court applied
the materiality standard in the manner contemplated by the
Supreme Court when prosecutors engage in intentional misconduct. 164
1.

The Importance of Mr. James's Testimony to the
Prosecution's Theory of the Case

A key factor the Hayes Court considered in applying the
materiality standard was the importance of Mr. James's testimony to the prosecution. It concluded that whether or not the
jury took Mr. James's word over that of Mr. Hayes was determinative of the outcome of the triaP65 Accordingly, the false
testimony that bolstered Mr. James's credibility was material.
[d. at 986.
[d. at 988.
164 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270 (1959), and Giglio v. United States,
405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
165 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 986 (9th Cir. 2005).
162

163
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Mr. James testified to several facts that were critical to the
prosecution's case. First, he was the only person who testified
that Mr. Hayes confessed to the murder.1 66 In addition, his testimony supported the prosecution's theory of burglary and
murder that led to Mr. Hayes's conviction and death sentence. 167 Specifically, the State had to prove Mr. Hayes's intent
to commit burglary.168 Because there was conflicting testimony
regarding who burglarized the office, the State's case depended
on the jury accepting Mr. James's version of events.1 69 The jury
had to believe that Mr. Hayes committed the burglary in order
to find the special circumstance true and to impose a death
sentence.1 70 By identifying the necessity of Mr. James's testimony to the prosecution's case, the Court concluded that it was
material.
On the other hand, the prosecutor's withholding of a deal
with a less important witness may not have had a material effect on the verdict because the jury could have reached its decision without finding the witness credible. However, the Hayes
case turned on whether Mr. James was more credible than Mr.
Hayes. Both defense counsel and prosecutor Van Oss emphasized this fact in closing arguments: the former stating, "[i]n
this case, you can only conclude that [Mr. Hayes] committed a
robbery or a burglary if you believe Andrew James beyond a
reasonable doubt ... "171 and the latter arguing, "Andrew James
may be a very bad man, he may have a bad past, he is not a
murderer as the defendant is in this case."172 The Court's consideration of the importance of Mr. James's testimony to the
prosecution's case supported its finding that the false evidence
was material.

2.

The Court's Finding That the "Secret" Deal Was Not
Cumulative

Another key factor in the majority's finding of materiality
was its conclusion that Mr. James's false testimony was non166Id. at 985.
167 Id. at 985-86.
168Id. at 985.
169Id.
170 See id. at 986.
171 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 986 (9th Cir. 2005).
172 Id. at 980.
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cumulative. The dissenters in Hayes argued that withholding
the "secret" deal from the jury was immaterial because Mr.
James had already been impeached with his transactional immunity, criminal history, and other favors provided by the
State.l 73 However, by distinguishing the "secret" deal from the
other impeachment evidence, the majority reached a different
and sounder conclusion.
a.

The (In)significance of Mr. James's Transactional
Immunity

The Court reasoned that a charge against Mr. James in the
Patel murder was unlikely, thus making his transactional immunity an unpersuasive factor in deciding his credibility. It
reasoned that no theory of the case, including the one set forth
by Mr. Hayes himself, implicated Mr. James in the murder of
Mr. Patel.1 74 According to Mr. Hayes, he had stabbed Mr. Patel
in self-defense.!75 According to the prosecution, Mr. Hayes
killed Mr. Patel as part of a plan to commit burglary.l7 6 In either scenario, Mr. James was not involved in Mr. Patel's death,
and therefore did not risk being charged with his murder.
Although testimony at the Hayes trial did implicate Mr.
James in the burglary, a burglary charge would have been
tenuous at best. Mr. Hayes testified that Mr. James had gone
down to the motel office on his own and had taken the cigarettes, and another witness testified that she had seen Mr.
James carrying boxes to his car.!77 According to his own testimony, Mr. James may have been an accessory to the burglary
by giving Mr. Hayes a ride with the stolen goods.l 78 However, a
charge of burglary based on these facts would not only have
been difficult to prove, but would have contradicted the State's
theory in the Hayes case. Since the prosecution contended that
Mr. Hayes murdered Mr. Patel in order to commit burglary,
charging Mr. James conflicted with the prosecution's interest
in seeking the death penalty. The majority recognized that the
prosecution's theory of felony-murder precluded its charging
[d. at 990 (Tallman, J., dissenting).
[d. at 972.
175 [d.
176 [d. at 985-86.
177 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972,975-76 (9th Cir. 2005).
178 [d. at 976.
173

174
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Mr. James with burglaryJ79 By distinguishing between the
likely effect on the jury of Mr. James's transactional immunity
from that of the "secret" deal, the Court found the latter noncumulative, and thus material. 180
b.

The Court's Conclusion That Mr. James' Impeachment
with His Prior Convictions Was Non-Cumulative

The Court noted that because both Mr. James and Mr.
Hayes had similar pasts, their impeachments at trial with
their prior drug use and criminal histories were unlikely to
significantly affect the jury's reasoning.1 81 In essence, the unsavory pasts of Mr. Hayes and Mr. James served to equalize
them in the jury's eyes in terms of their moral characters.
Therefore, the knowledge that Mr. James had an added incentive to lie in this case might have changed the jury's impression
of his credibility. The Court's comparison of the characters of
both Mr. James and Mr. Hayes allowed it to conclude that the
impeachment for prior convictions and drug use did not render
the "secret" deal cumulative.

3.

The Materiality of Mr. Van Oss's Failure to Correct False
Testimony

By considering the outcome of the trial had Mr. Van Oss
performed his duty to correct Mr. James's false testimony, the
Court recognized another theory for a finding of materiality.182
The Hayes majority first considered the materiality of Mr. Van
Oss's failure to correct Mr. James's false testimony regarding
his pending felonies.1 83 More significantly, it also considered
the impact on the jury if Van Oss had corrected Mr. James's
testimony, which would have required revealing the "secret"
deal to the jury.184 In recognizing the devastating impact this
would have had on the State's case, the Court found that this

Id. at 985.
See supra notes 57·61 and accompanying text. Although Lambert involved a
Brady violation and was not cited in Hayes, it engaged in a similar analysis in finding
undisclosed evidence non-cumulative.
181 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 987 (9th Cir. 2005).
182 [d. at 988.
183 [d.
184 [d.
179

180
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constitutional error was also material.1 85 Although the Court
did not ultimately rely on this reasoning to reach its conclusion
to grant relief, the discussion indicated the Court's approval for
considering this issue. Because the prosecution has a duty to
correct false evidence, it follows that a court should consider
the impact on the jury of fulfilling that duty, as the Court did
in Hayes. Thus, this reasoning may be useful in finding materiality for the knowing presentation of false evidence in future
cases.
The depth of the Ninth Circuit majority's analysis allowed
the Court to reach its decision to grant Mr. Hayes a new trial.
Moreover, its application of facts and law in Hayes demonstrated a commitment to taking allegations of prosecutorial
misconduct seriously. Other courts should adhere to the
Court's reasoning to address the problem of wrongful convictions.
C.

THE HAYES DECISION'S POSITIVE IMPLICATIONS FOR
PREVENTING AND REVERSING WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS

Prosecutorial misconduct has emerged as a troubling and
significant cause of wrongful convictions.l 86 In addition, perjured testimony of prosecution witnesses-particularly accomplices-is also to blame in many of these cases. 187 However, an
examination of the Hayes Court's materiality analysis reveals
several positive implications for addressing these issues. First,
in light of the limitations on habeas review, the lack of prosecution discipline, and the absence of other remedies for wrongful
convictions, courts must engage in a meaningful application of
the materiality standard when there are allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and the use of false evidence. 188 Second,
courts must focus, as did the Ninth Circuit, on the prosecutor's
duty to correct testimony regarding a deal with a witness,
whether express or implied, to prevent wrongful convictions by
encouraging prosecutors to make sure the testimony of accomplice witnesses is truthful and correcting it when it is not.1 89
Finally, courts should follow the Ninth Circuit's materiality
185Id.

See supra notes 2·4 and accompanying text.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
188 See infra notes 191·202 and accompanying text.
189 See infra notes 203-206 and accompanying text.
186

187
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analysis and its reluctance to accept the Government's assertions to reverse wrongful convictions resulting from state misconduct. 190

1.

The Need for Meaningful Review of Cases Alleging
Prosecutorial Misconduct and the Use of False Testimony to
Address Wrongful Convictions

In their book, Actual Innocence, the founders of the Innocence Project begin the chapter on prosecutorial misconduct by
emphasizing courts' resistance to reversal: "[f]or an innocent
person, the two most dangerous words in the language of the
law are 'harmless error."'191 They explain that appellate courts
use these "magic words" to "absolve ... prosecutors of misconduct."192 The authors go on to describe numerous cases in
which prosecutors engaged in misconduct that was found
harmless by the courts, yet the defendants were later exonerated based on DNA evidence. 193 In the context of a prosecutor's
knowing use of false evidence, a court finding a violation immaterial is analogous to it finding the error harmless. 194
This reluctance by reviewing courts to meaningfully examine cases of misconduct,195 coupled with the chilling effect that
the AEDPA has had on federal habeas review,196 has created a
harsh climate in which the wrongfully convicted must plead
their cases. Thus, carefully applying the established Supreme
Court standards that are available on habeas review has become even more important. The reversal in the Hayes case illustrates the difference that courts can make when such a close
analysis is applied. For example, the Ninth Circuit's careful
consideration of each piece of impeachment evidence led to its
conclusion that the "secret" deal was non-cumulative and thus
material. 197
In addition, as reversals continue to occur based on DNA

See supra notes 152·161 and accompanying text.
BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD & JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: WHEN
JUSTICE GOES WRONG AND How TO MAKE IT RIGHT 172 (New American Library 2001).
190

191

192Id.

at 172-74.
194 See supra notes 30 and 125-126 and accompanying text.
195 See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
196 See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
197 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 988 (9th Cir. 2005).
193Id.
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evidence, it becomes apparent that far more innocent persons
are incarcerated whose alleged crime did not create this type of
evidence. Although numerous proposals have been made for
remedying wrongful convictions,198 few thus far have been implemented. Hence, granting reversal on habeas review based
on due process violations continues to be a vital remedy in
overturning wrongful convictions in spite of the breakthroughs
in scientific evidence.
Another important reason for a close analysis of cases implicating the materiality standard is the lack of prosecutorial
discipline for misconduct. 199 With rare exception, no prosecutors have been disciplined for their roles in wrongful convictions, even in those cases in which the misconduct was deemed
grossly negligent or intentional. 200 In fact, in almost all cases
in which prosecutorial misconduct was found, no discipline was
imposed. 201 Consequently, little deterrence exists in terms of
damage to prosecutors' careers or reputations. To illustrate,
prosecutor Van Oss is now Superior Court Judge Van Oss in
the same county where he lied to the judge and jury during the
proceedings against Mr. Hayes decades earlier.202 In light of
these circumstances, adjudication of habeas claims based on allegations of misconduct is one of the only avenues through
which courts review a prosecutor's actions. Accordingly, courts
have a duty to do so meaningfully.

2.

Use of the Ninth Circuit's Materiality Standard to Prevent
and Reverse Wrongful Convictions Based on False
Testimony
In Hayes, the Court considered not only the materiality of

198 See Ellen Yaroshefsy, Wrongful Convictions: It is Time to Take Prosecution
Discipline Seriously, 8 UDC L. REV. 275, 278 (2004) (proposing the creation of innocence commissions); see also Sam Roberts, Note, Should Prosecutors be Required to Record Their Pretrial Interviews with Accomplices and Snitches?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
257, 262 (2005) (proposing recording all pretrial meetings between police, prosecutors
and cooperating accomplices and snitches).
199 See Yaroshefsy, supra note 198, at 278·79.
200 See id.
201 See id. at 277. (finding that prosecutors are rarely disciplined even for misconduct that is considered "highly reprehensible," such as suppressing facts and secreting
evidence).
202 Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 976 (9th Cir. 2005); San Joaquin County Superior
Court,
Judicial
Officers
of
the
Superior
Court,
at
http://www.stocktoncourt.org/courts/peoplel.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2006).
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the false testimony regarding the "secret" deal, but also the
impact the prosecutor's correction would have had on the verdict.203 This new factor in considering the prosecutor's duty to
correct gives "teeth" to this standard by taking into account
how such a correction would affect the credibility of the prosecution in the eyes of the jury. Although commentators already
view this duty to correct as discouraging prosecutors from using false testimony, this added factor could further deter prosecutors from using testimony that is likely perjured. 204 Furthermore, the duty to correct can also help address the general
problem of perjured testimony as prosecutors may take more
seriously the possibility that witnesses are not being completely truthful about the incentives they have received for
their testimony.205 Therefore, the Court's reinforcement of the
duty to correct and its focus on the consequences of not fulfilling that duty may help address the problem of wrongful convictions caused by perjury and prosecutorial misconduct.
The Hayes Court's unwillingness to accept the Government's assertions regarding the "secret" deal may further deter
prosecutors from concealing incentives or allowing potentially
false testimony to go uncorrected. 206 This suspicion is logical:
when a court reaches the question of materiality, it has already
established that the prosecution has engaged in misconduct of
constitutional magnitude. Therefore, to rely on the State or the
Government's version of the facts is to accept the view of persons who have already demonstrated that they are capable of
deceit. If other courts review such claims similar to the review
by the Ninth Circuit, the prosecutor's word may be insufficient
if a court's factual analysis leads it to conclude otherwise.
Therefore, the Ninth's Circuit's decision in Hayes may further
See supra notes 182·185 and accompanying text.
See R. Michael Cassidy, "Soft Words of Hope:" Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses,
and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1129, 1163-64 (2004) (arguing that although greater restrictions should be implemented to prevent a prosecutor's
complicity in perjury, Napue's duty to correct false testimony can help reveal inducements prosecutors give to cooperating witnesses in exchange for their testimony); see
also Roberts, supra note 198, at 267 (noting that although prosecutors are not required
to record interviews with cooperating and accomplice witnesses, their affirmative duty
to correct false testimony is one due process protection for defendants).
205 See Cassidy, supra note 204 and accompanying text; see also Bennett L.
Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 324, 337-38
(asserting that in addition to the prosecutor's duty not subvert the truth, prosecutors
have a duty to prejudge whether witness testimony is truthful).
206 See supra notes 156-162 and accompanying text.
203
204
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instruct prosecutors to take greater care in both gwmg inducements to witnesses and correcting their testimony at trial.

IV. CONCLUSION
Rarely is a defendant fortunate enough to obtain signed
statements from a prosecutor and a perjurious witness attesting to the unfairness of the trial, as was the case in Pyle u.
Kansas. 207 In most cases, the parties dispute the facts surrounding the misconduct and courts must make determinations
based on those facts that are available. However, courts should
examine every fact at their disposal and thoroughly consider
materiality without a bias towards the Government if they are
serious about addressing the problem of wrongful convictions.
The profoundly worrisome statistics linking prosecutorial misconduct and false testimony to wrongful convictions indicate
that subsequent courts should follow the majority's analysis in
Hayes. 208
Although the Supreme Court requires that the materiality
standard be met in order for a defendant to be granted relief in
cases involving a prosecutor's knowing use of false evidence,209
the Hayes case illustrates that a court's willingness to meaningfully apply this standard can make the difference between
affirmance and reversal. Only Mr. James and Mr. Hayes know
precisely what happened on January 1, 1980, but the Ninth
Circuit properly found that regardless, the prosecutor's actions
caused Mr. Hayes to be sentenced to death without a fair trial.
Accordingly, courts must carefully consider cases involving
such allegations to ensure that this standard does not become a
barrier to justice that allows wrongful convictions to stand and
emboldens prosecutors to obtain convictions at any cost.
Hence, courts must follow the Ninth Circuit's lead to confront
the issues of prosecutorial misconduct and wrongful convictions
and to maintain the integrity of the criminal justice system.

Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 215 (1942).
See supra notes 2·4 and accompanying text.
209 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
207
208
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